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 The Role of Fringe Benefits in Operator
 Off-Farm Labor Supply
 Helen H. Jensen and Priscilla Salant
 The last thirty years have seen a major shift in
 the share of total compensation paid to work-
 ers in the form of nonwage fringe benefits, that
 is, payments in a form other than currently
 spendable cash (Chen). Fringe benefits have
 become increasingly important because they
 are a source of income that receives preferen-
 tial tax treatment, and can often be offered at
 group savings, as in the case of purchase of life
 and health insurance.
 The tax and group rate advantages of fringe
 benefits as compensation for work become
 available to most farm households only
 through off-farm employment. Thus, it is im-
 portant to understand the relationship be-
 tween nonwage compensation and off-farm
 labor supply. Concentration on the role of
 money wages in inducing off-farm labor sup-
 ply neglects the potention effect of additional
 income in the form of fringe benefits.
 Off-farm work by members of farm house-
 holds has become a well-established strategy
 for using farm-based labor resources. In 1983,
 45% of employed farm residents in the United
 States worked solely or principally in nonag-
 ricultural industries, up from 34% in 1960
 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1961, 1984).
 Fifty-five percent of all farm households re-
 ported off-farm employment by the operator
 and/or spouse in 1979 (U.S. Department of
 Commerce 1982). Thus, a significant number
 of farm persons receive compensation for time
 spent in off-farm activities.
 This paper focuses on the contribution of
 fringe benefits to off-farm labor supply. We
 examine the types of benefits received by per-
 sons working off-farm, and develop a model of
 operator off-farm labor supply which explicit-
 ly takes account of the fringe benefit compo-
 nent of off-farm compensation. Data from
 the 1981 U.S. Department of Agriculture Fam-
 ily Farm Survey in Mississippi and Tennes-
 see are used to describe the composition of
 benefits received and estimate parameters in a
 labor supply model.'
 The outline is as follows: first, a discussion
 of the role of fringe benefits as a form of com-
 pensation; second, a description of the off-
 farm labor supply model; third, empirical evi-
 dence on the role of fringe benefits in operator
 off-farm labor supply; and finally, conclusions
 with respect to the role of fringe benefits.
 Fringe Benefits as Compensation
 The standard view of fringe benefits is that
 they, like nonpecuniary characteristics of
 jobs, provide a substitute for money wages
 (Ehrenberg and Smith). That is, workers are
 willing to accept a lower money wage in return
 for more fringe benefit compensation. Two
 factors account for a relative price differential
 which favors receiving some income in the
 form of employer-paid benefits. First, em-
 ployer-provided fringe benefits are not taxed
 as income. Second, lower per unit costs may
 be achieved by employer group purchase of
 the commodity or service provided as fringes.
 Other institutional factors have an effect
 on whether fringe benefits are offered, for
 example, industry type, union activity, and
 length of time of worker employment.
 There is some empirical support for the hy-
 pothesis that wage payments and fringe ben-
 efits are substitutes, particularly in the case
 of pension benefits (Woodbury). Just like
 wages, nonwage compensation enhances in-
 come and, hence, well-being. Although their
 actual value to the individual may be less than
 the cost of providing the benefit, in most cases
 the employee can opt out of receiving the ben-
 efit should the value be negative. Thus, in-
 Helen H. Jensen is an assistant professor, Department of Econom-
 ics, Iowa State University; Priscilla Salant is an economist, Eco-
 nomic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture and an
 adjunct instructor, Department of Agricultural Economies, Uni-
 versity of Wisconsin.
 The authors acknowledge the helpful comments received from
 Wallace E. Huffman, Peter Orazem, and William E. Saupe at
 earlier stages of this paper.
 I The estimation is reported in detail in a forthcoming USDA
 Economic Reseach Service staff paper.
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 creases in fringe benefits should lead to in-
 creased value of time spent in off-farm work.
 The lack of consistently unambiguous find-
 ings regarding the effect of fringe benefits on
 labor supply has been attributed to the im-
 portance of labor market institutions affecting
 the type of benefit compensation and the fact
 that employees themselves may not be fully
 informed about the value of fringe benefits.
 Off-Farm Labor Supply
 The distinguishing feature of the off-farm labor
 supply decision is that in allocation of the
 scarce resource time, the individual's time
 spent in nonfarm market work competes di-
 rectly with time spent working on the farm
 (see e.g., Huffman, Sumner). Thus, the im-
 portant criterion for off-farm labor supply is
 that the marginal return from time spent in
 off-farm work is greater than (or equal to) the
 marginal return from time spent in farm ac-
 tivities (or other household activities, includ-
 ing leisure). Factors which increase marginal
 productivity in off-farm work relative to farm
 work or household work are associated with
 increased off-farm labor supply.
 Time allocated to farm work yields an im-
 plicit return equal to the value of the marginal
 product of the labor input. In competitive
 labor markets, time allocated to market work,
 that is, to off-farm employment, is paid the
 value of its marginal product-and compen-
 sated in the form of direct market wages or
 indirectly as "fringe benefit" compensation.
 Other time is allocated to household activities
 and is valued at its opportunity cost, which is
 equal to the (highest) value of alternative use.
 The farm individual allocates time to market
 work when the marginal return (including
 wages and benefits) from time in market work
 is greater than the marginal return from time
 spent in farm work. Commuting costs, as well
 as other negative job characteristics, detract
 from this return, while positive, nonpecuniary
 job characteristics enhance the return. Fringe
 benefits viewed in this context increase the
 return from off-farm work above the level of
 the money wage.
 Empirical Evidence
 The data used in this analysis are from the
 1981 USDA Family Farm Survey. The survey
 was based on a stratified cluster sample design
 which yielded usable questionnaires from
 1,087 farm families in twenty-three counties in
 northern Mississippi and six counties in
 southwestern Tennessee.2
 Agriculturally, the area is typical of much of
 the South insofar as a significant proport on of
 the land is in farms, and agriculture is domi-
 nated by small operations. The survey site
 contains no large metr politan centers, al-
 though there are a number of small and me-
 dium-size towns that provide some employ-
 ment opportunities for farm residents. Low
 population density in the survey area has not
 encouraged either a strong service sector or
 generally diversified economic activities.
 Sixty-two percent of the households dis-
 cussed in this report reported off-farm work
 by the operator and/or spouse in 1980; 48% of
 the operators, and 37% of the spouses worked
 off-farm. Most persons employed off-farm re-
 ported full-time wage or salary jobs. As is the
 case of employment in many rural labor mar-
 kets, these jobs were generally low skilled.
 They paid, on average, $5.60 per hour; 14% of
 workers earned less than $3.10 per hour.
 Four fringe benefits were commonly re-
 ported: paid vacation and/or sick leave, health
 insurance, private pension plans, and life in-
 surance. Thirty percent of all workers re-
 ceived all four of the benefits; 53% received at
 least three; 23% received none. As reported in
 table 1, full-time workers, those in durable
 goods manufacturing, and those with higher
 wage rates were most likely to receive ben-
 efits. Intermittent employees (those working
 less than 1,152 hours per year) were least
 likely to receive the benefits.
 An operator labor supply model was esti-
 mated in which hours of off-farm work were
 assumed to be a function of both the fringe
 benefit and wage component of compensation,
 among other variables.
 The empirical specification of the wage, ben-
 efits, and hours of market work equations are
 of the form:
 k
 (1) In WjI = /3iXij + Uu
 i=1
 m
 (2) Bj = I yzSizj + U21
 i= 1
 2 For purposes of this report, a farm is defined as a business that
 produced agricultural sales of at least $1,000 in 1980 or would have
 done so under typical growing conditions. The farm operator was
 designated as the person responsible for major administrative and
 managerial functions, as well as for day-to-day decisions on the
 farm. See Salant for more information on the sample design.
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 Table 1. Worker and Employment Characteristics, By Benefits Received
 Workers Reporting Benefit
 Total Paid Health Life Pension
 Item Workers a Leave Insurance Insurance Plan
 ------------------------------------- (%)------------------------------
 Operator status
 Operator 52 68 60 46 48
 Spouse 48 69 59 40 43
 100
 Employment off-farmb
 Intermittent 20 25 20 16 21
 Part-time 20 65 55 40 56
 Full-ti e 60 85 73 52 50
 100
 Industry
 Manufacturing
 Durable 18 93 85 74 60
 Nondurable 13 80 72 43 41
 Service 34 57 46 31 48
 Trade 11 47 37 27 11
 Other 24 65 60 42 49
 100
 Wage rate per hour
 Less than $3.10 14 41 31 24 24
 $3.10-4.49 37 70 62 39 36
 $4.50-5.99 15 77 69 49 43
 $6.00-8.99 22 77 64 46 64
 $9.00 or more 12 67 68 63 68
 100
 Source: 1981 USDA Family Farm Survey.
 a Only operator and spouse are included as workers here.
 b Intermittent refers to less than 1,152 hours in 1980; part-time refers to at least 1,152 but less than 1,680 hours; full-time refers to 1,680
 hours or more.
 (3) Tmj = 811n W, + 82BS, + 8 Z, + 5
 i=3
 wherej is 1,..., n individuals; In W3is natural
 log of wage; BJ is fringe benefits; Uu, U,, ?3 are random errors; X1 is exogenous variables
 affecting wages; Si, exogenous variables af-
 fecting benefits; Z2, exogenous variables af-
 fecting hours of off-farm labor supply (Tm),
 including those that affect operator on-farm
 productivity. Estimated wages and estimated
 benefits enter the "hours" equation as instru-
 mental variables. Equations (1) and (2) were
 estimated in a two-stage procedure in order to
 take account of potential sample selection
 bias.3 The sample of working farm operators
 was used in the estimation of equations (1),
 (2), and (3). A significance level of .20 is used
 as a criterion in the following discussion.
 Both wages and benefits were estimated as
 functions of operator human capital and labor
 market characteristics (table 2). In the wage
 equation, age and age-squared had the ex-
 pected nonlinear effect (+, -); the effect of
 education on wages was positive; being white
 increased wages. There was no significant
 sample selection bias.
 In the estimation of benefits, which were
 measured as the probability of receiving health
 insurance, operator age, education, and the
 industry characteristics of the operator's em-
 ployment were included as explanatory vari-
 ables. The equation was estimated as a probit
 function using the maximum likelihood tech-
 nique. The most significant determinants of
 benefits received were the industry variables.
 Operators employed in manufacturing, espe-
 cially durable manufacturing, were more likely
 3We are concerned that any estimations based only on observa-
 tions of operators working off-farm will be biased because these
 operators may not provide random observations. Our sample may
 be nonrandom because operators without off-farm jobs have been
 censored. That is, the errors of the estimated compensation func-
 tions are not independent of the errors in the sample selection
 criteria. The regression functions on compensation are conditional
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 Table 2. Estimated Coefficients for Operators Off-Farm Compensation
 Wages Benefits
 Explanatory Estimated Standard Estimated Asymptotic
 Variables Coefficient Error Coefficient Standard Error
 CONSTANT -.153 .424 .996 1.349
 AGE .066 .016 -.017 .053
 AGESQ - .00077 .00018 .0001 .0006
 EDUCATION .045 .008 .030 .027
 NONFARM TRAINING .077 .096
 RACE (White = 1) .099 .077
 HEALTH PROBLEM -.059 .126
 INDUSTRY
 TRADE - .338 .243
 CONSTRUCTION -.192 .270
 MANUF-NONDUR .521 .302
 MANUF-DURABLE 1.098 .242
 SAMPLE SELECTION .081 .080 -.966 .259
 Dependent variable LNWAGE HEALTH INSURANCE (0, 1)
 Estimation technique OLS Probit/Maximum Likelihood
 Number of observations 301 301
 Adjusted R-Square .17
 Log of likelihood function - 170
 -2 (log of likelihood ratio) 68 (df = 8)
 Source: 1981 USDA Family Farm Survey.
 to receive benefits. Sample selection was sig-
 nificant in this estimation.
 The estimation of hours of labor supplied (3)
 using ordinary least squares allows testing for
 the significance of wages and benefits as de-
 terminants of off-farm hours of work. The
 estimated values of wages and benefits (hold-
 ing constant sample selection) enter the equa-
 tion (table 3). Both had a positive effect on
 operator hours of off-farm work, indicating
 that both money wages and benefits induce
 off-farm labor supply. This is consistent with
 the economic valuation of fringes. As ex-
 pected, unearned income has a negative effect
 on labor supply, as does operator education.
 That is, more education makes the operator
 more productive on the farm, holding com-
 pensation constant. The negative effect of hav-
 ing children over eighteen suggests the pres-
 ence of intrafamily allocation decisions.
 Discussion
 Fringe benefits from off-farm employment are
 an important aspect of the off-farm work deci-
 sion. The empirical analysis supports this. We
 found that ben fits (as well as ages) have a
 positive effect on operator off-farm labor sup-
 ply. Thus, in treating off-farm work as a tool of
 management for farm-based labor resources, it
 is important to evaluate work off of the farm in
 Table 3. Hours of Off-Farm Work: Estimated
 Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares Re-
 gression
 Explanatory Estimated Standard
 Variablesa Coefficients Errors
 CONSTANT -249.52 592.34
 AGE b
 AGESQ -.03 .06
 EDUCATION -49.50 21.96
 HEALTH PROBLEM 6.80 185.33
 RACE (White = 1) 201.78 130.04
 EDUCATION SPOUSE -15.25 18.74
 MARRIED 375.46 261.36
 CHILD UNDER 6 14.79 121.01
 CHILD 6-17 27.22 81.66
 CHILD 18+ - 155.51 86.67
 UNEARNED Y (000) - 29.62 18.09
 ESTWAGE 1072.70 381.98
 ESTBENEFIT 360.65 228.12
 Dependent variable HOURS
 Number of observations 301
 Adjusted R-squared .26
 Source: 1981 USDA Family Farm Survey.
 a The set of farm type and specialization variables are not re-
 ported here. They are available from the authors.
 bAGE did not meet the tolerance test (=.01) and was not
 entered into the estimated model.
 on the criteria for selecting an operator working off-farm. First
 participation was estimated for the entire sample using all exoge-
 nous variables determining relative marginal productivity of time.
 This estimation yields a term (referred to as sample selection in
 table 2) to be included in the subsequent estimation of compensa-
 tion to test for sample selectivity bias (Heckman).
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 light of its full return. Off-farm work augments
 well-being through the enhancement of both
 money income and the value of fringes, as
 evidenced by their role in compensating the
 increased labor supply.
 Descriptive data, as well as the estimation
 of the probability of receiving health insur-
 ance, show that institutional factors in the
 labor market play an important role in benefit
 availability. From a rural development per-
 spective, the finding that certain industries,
 like manufacturing, offer relatively more
 fringe benefits, and that these benefits them-
 selves induce off-farm labor are important
 considerations in evaluating the effects of in-
 dustry location. In addition, the clear distinc-
 tion in availability of fringes to those working
 more than intermittently suggests the greater
 value to farm households of increased com-
 mitment to off-farm work.
 Several problems arise in evaluating the role
 of benefits in operator off-farm labor supply.
 The appropriate measure of benefits received
 should be a dollar value. Such a value is
 difficult to determine both theoretically and
 empirically, and was not available in the data.
 As such, it was impossible to estimate a will-
 ingness to substitute fringe benefits for wages.
 However, this may be a less important phe-
 nomenon in a labor market characterized by
 limited local opportunities. We have little in-
 formation on the specific labor market which
 each individual faced.
 In addition, the household decision-making
 process may involve joint decisions. By look-
 ing only at the operator decision, possible in-
 terdependence with the spouse's decision with
 respect to off-farm labor supply and fringes is
 lost.
 While we did find that fringe benefits induce
 more operator off-farm labor supply, it is im-
 portant to recognize that the operator may not
 be well informed about the value of benefits.
 Thus, any labor supply response to benefits is
 related to the perator's specific knowledge of
 the benefits' contribution to off-farm income.
 Finally, we recognize that the availability of
 many fringe b nefits o workers is in the form
 of goods and services which protect human
 capital (such as health insura ce or sick
 leave). We suspect, though cannot show with
 this data set, hat the contribution of fringe
 benefits o well-being may also come in the
 protection or enhancemen  of human capital
 through in-ki d provision of th  human capi-
 tal-preserving goods and services, indepen-
 dent of the direct money effect. If this is the
case, the fring  benefits enhance well-being
 both hrough their ob erved effect on in-
 creased income, and through their unobserved
 effect on better health or other human capital.
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